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Current literature is claiming for an important relationship between conscious 
experiencing and executive functions (mainly working memory). Since there is still a 
lack of empirical evidence relating those mental processes, the aim of this research 
is to continue exploring those relations by finding out how different components of 
working memory may affect the threshold to consciousness. The experiment 
contained three groups of people who performed two concurrent computerized tasks. 
The first one consisted of a replication of a priming and subjective visibility task (de 
Loof et al., 2013) for all the groups. Both experimental groups differed from the 
control group in the additional mental load due to the second task and differed 
between them in the nature of the load (remembering phonological or spatial 
information). Psychology students participated in the study facing the pc monitor to 
perform the first task alone if assigned to the control group, or concurrent to a Corsi 
Block-Tapping Test or a Phonological Maintenance Task if assigned to the 
experimental groups. The results seem to suggest that the spatial overload group 
had more trouble when trying to be conscious of the prime number in comparison to 
the other two. These results show accordance with previous research and could be 
the first to show a possible working memory module-dependence when it comes to 
conscious perception. This view could lead to new important reformulations of 
theories of consciousness and language. 
Keywords: Working memory modules, working memory load, mental load, 
consciousness, conscious experiencing, executive functions, Corsi Block-Tapping 
Test, Phonological Maintenance Task, psychology 
 
  





Nowadays it seems that everyone in cognitive sciences agrees with the notion of 
consciousness as a mental function arisen somehow by the interconnection of 
different brain processes. This apparent shared opinion could be simply explained 
making some scientific assumptions:  first, that everything is made of matter; second, 
that the brain is causing all sort of behaviours; and, third, that consciousness must 
be a behaviour that we can therefore study. Such approach goes in line with some of 
the generic empirical findings on consciousness. Dehaene and Naccache (2001) 
provide evidence that cognitive processing is possible without consciousness, that 
attention is an essential precondition for being conscious of something and that there 
is a necessity of consciousness for some integrative mental operations. These 
findings must be considered as they are in line with the basic scientific assumptions 
on consciousness as a brain product serving to an adaptive purpose. 
Although there is a common attitude towards its investigation, more than often 
scientists are not able to share the same conceptualization towards consciousness. 
This lack of a common theoretical conceptualization could be explained by the 
ambiguity of the word “conscious”. Dehaene and Changeux (2011) identify two 
different meanings on this word: on one hand, the intransitive use (e.g., “the patient 
was still conscious”) can be interpreted as a state that can vary continuously and in 
which the person is passively perceiving the world; on the other hand, the transitive 
use (e.g., “I was not conscious of the red light”) can be interpreted as an special 
integrative type of active processing, defining the contents of consciousness that can 
be accessed and reported. These two notions are related intimately to two different 
ways of investigating consciousness. Using electroencephalography and averaging 
the recordings, it is possible to observe an electrical response (called evoked 
potential) towards the frontal electrodes (called P3a) when the brain is automatically 
or unconsciously orienting its selective attention to the stimulus. This signal is 
different from a late and widely distributed event-related potential wave called P3b, 
which is strongly linked to consciousness (Del Cul et al., 2007). 
Following Purves et al. (2013), the first term described refers to a generalized brain 
state usually defined as wakefulness and entails a variety of physiological conditions 
at which there is more or less ability to react towards stimuli. Although wakefulness 
is a prerequisite, it does not define the subjective contents of awareness. Thus, this 
second term identifies consciousness as a psychological process whose basic 
objective is to integrate different brain processes, unifying our experiences into a 
single and unified story (Broks, 2003). Such a complex mental function cannot be 
explained easily by a generalized state since most events happening outside and 
inside us cannot be consciously reported while being awake. Moreover, several 
findings might be notifying us that consciousness is rather an active brain product 
serving for an adaptive purpose strongly linked to the highest kind of mental 
processes (Sterzer et al., 2009). Thus, the Prefrontal Parietal Network (PPN) could 
be causing the conscious experience, as it seems according to some studies (Rees, 
2007; Rees et al., 2002). For instance, Del Cul et al. (2009) have documented 
patients suffering from damage to the prefrontal cortex and how this relates to a 
different threshold for subjective visibility. Besides, as Bor and Seth (2012) argue, 
there seems to be a neural overlap between areas involving attention, executive 
functions (mainly working memory) and visual awareness. They suggest 
consciousness as a holistic process carrying on complex and relevant information to 
achieve a specific adaptive goal in a highly variable environment. 




Important methodological questions may arise when trying to investigate such a 
subjective and ephemeral phenomenon. Is it possible to rely on the reported 
contents of consciousness? Some authors (Gamez, 2014; Cohen and Dennett, 
2011) argue that a conscious report, or a correlate to its activity, is necessary 
functionally connected to the process of awareness itself. In this sense, it could still 
be used in experimental psychology as a tool to approach effectively to the 
thresholds of subjective sensations. For a critic review of the neural correlates of 
conscious awareness look at De Graaf et al. (2012), and for a deep review of the 
methods to measure consciousness read Seth et al. (2008). 
At this point, as conscious awareness implies attention and the PPN, could it be 
possible that those mental functions underpinning consciousness are the executive 
ones? Some authors (Van Gaal et al., 2012) support strong links between these two 
brain functions, though we still need to understand the directions of those relations. 
Executive Functions (EFs) or cognitive control are names given to a group of top-
down mental processes allocated primarily in the prefrontal cortex that are used 
when it is impossible to rely on automatic or conditioned responses and therefore it 
is needed to pay attention (Diamond, 2013). There are there elemental or core 
cognitive controllers: inhibition (controlling of one’s attentional resources and 
stopping other processes or actions), working memory (holding information in mind 
while working with it) and shifting (flexibly changing the focus of our attention and 
perspectives). From these three basic EFs, other higher-order EFs can be built, such 
as reasoning or planning (Collins and Koechlin, 2012).  
Bearing in mind that working memory and attention seem to be independent mental 
functions from consciousness itself (Soto et al., 2011; Dutta et al., 2014; Koch and 
Tsuchiya, 2007), it should be introduced that there is a promising relation between 
working memory and consciousness in different cognitive theories (Soto and 
Silvanto, 2014). For instance, in the Global Workspace theory (Dehaene et al., 1998) 
some preconscious highly specialized functions compete among themselves to get 
access to a global workspace, which has been conceptualized as with the same 
contents as those held in working memory. In the Attended Intermediate-level 
Representations theory of Prinz (2000) it is suggested that a stimulus is consciously 
perceived when its preconscious representation enter the working memory system 
thanks to the focus of attention. Finally, if consciousness is theorized as “the 
remembered present” in a Dynamic Core (Edelman and Tononi, 2000; Edelman et 
al., 2011), the continuous maintenance and activation of memories correspond to 
working memory, which would be causing consciousness itself in an eventual 
neuronal group selection process. In addition to this theoretical overlap, both mental 
functions are limited in their processing capacity to some extent (Crick and Koch, 
1990; Miller, 1956), as well as it is known that their main focus of action is the 
integration of multimodal information (Zeki and Bartels, 1999). 
It seems, then, that the current literature is claiming for an important relationship 
between conscious experiencing and executive functions, but since there is still a 
lack of empirical evidence relating those mental processes, some have started to 
explore the relations between working memory and subjective visibility. De Loof et al. 
(2013) importantly suggest that when the working memory span is narrowed 
overloading it, the subjective visibility (the conscious report) on a cognitive task is 
consequently impoverished as these two processes share the same neural 




resources. Also, they observed that a higher working memory load reduces the 
amount of cognitive resources causing an increment in the congruency effect (less 
mental ability to shift between tasks). It was concluded consciousness to depend on 
the available working memory resources. 
Nowadays working memory (WM) is conceptualized in a multi-component theory as 
an integrated system fusing at least two basic types of subsystems depending on the 
content held (Baddeley, 2011). The phonological loop is the module processing 
verbal information, whilst the visuo-spatial sketchpad is the module processing visual 
nonverbal information. Both subsystems of WM hold their respective information “on 
line” until that piece of information reaches the long-term memory system or is 
replaced by new perceived stimuli. 
As De Loof et al. (2013) enquire: “to what extent do working memory and 
consciousness overlap? Is it complete?”. In this sense, the aim of this research is to 
continue exploring those relations by finding out how different aspects of working 
memory may contribute to our experiencing. This research runs the same 
experiment but comparing the effects of two different module-specific tasks, one 
targeting the visuo-spatial memory load and one targeting the phonological memory 
load. At that point we might be able to differentiate and attribute the effects of 
working memory load in visual awareness to one specific information path. Thus, 
specifically, three groups are needed. One control group compared to two 
experimental groups differentiated by adding some mental load (factor) to the 
dependent variable (the same priming and subjective visibility task used in De Loof 
et al., 2013). These two experimental groups should differentiate between them in 
the nature of the load using a Corsi Block-Tapping Test to increase the visuo-spatial 
WM load and a Phonological Maintenance Task to increase the verbal WM load. 
A between-subjects design has been chosen because although it requires of more 
time and higher sample sizes (important limitations in an undergraduate research 
project), it will also provide a more conservative and humble approach as well as a 
clearer differentiation between possible effects observed. As Charness et al. (2012) 
argue, one of the most important limitations from a within-subjects design arises from 
the possible contamination of an effect because of the previous task. In this research 
project, it would not be a good idea to engage the participants in different working 
memory tasks as they could increase the general short-term memory load occulting 
the specific ways in which every module interacts with the awareness network. So, in 
order to avoid a possible process of summation or redundancy gain from one module 
to the other (Roser & Corballis, 2002), a between-subjects design seems to be the 
best experimental option in this research. 
The priming task replicated consists of a presentation of a prime number appearing 
and disappearing very quickly before the presentation of a target number inserted in 
a mask. The latter needs to be categorized as larger or smaller than five while it is 
needed to consciously report whether the first number had been seen or not.  
The Corsi Block-Tapping Test is a widely used tool to assess the visuo-spatial 
module of working memory in a wide range of settings. It was developed by Corsi 
(1972) and consists of a layout of nine cubes above a board. The experimenter taps 
a sequence of cubes and asks the participant to repeat that sequence. As the length 
of sequences increases, the difficulty of the task increases and the span of the visuo-




spatial working memory can be measured. There have been studies trying to find 
new computerized ways of administration (Claessen et al., 2015) as well as 
normative data, showing preferential activation in the right hemisphere (Kessels et 
al., 2000). 
In its definition, the Phonological Maintenance Task used by Shivde & Thompson-
Schill (2004) consists of a delayed judgment task in which participants have to look 
at a word and maintain it during a delay phase. After waiting, they are shown another 
non-existing monosyllabic word that has to be judged as with a similar or different 
rhyme as one of the syllables inside the remembered word. The longer the number 
of syllables to recognize, the higher the phonological working memory load will be. 
Phonological WM tasks as this one has shown correlated activations in Broca’s Area 
or inferior frontal gyrus as well as in the left superior parietal lobe (Shivde & 
Thompson-Schill, 2004; Fiez, 1997; Paulesu et al., 1993). 
Following the previous empirical findings, it is hypothesized the experimental groups 
to show a decrease ratio in the seen responses in comparison to the control group 
as the amount of information entering the conscious network should be decreased 
due to the neural overlap and overload of WM. The possible differences between the 
experimental conditions will be explored. 
Methodology 
Participants 
Thirty-two psychology students from the University of Plymouth (United Kingdom) 
participated in the experiment separated into three groups using randomization as 
inclusion criteria. Although there were considerably less men (n = 6) than women (n 
= 24), the groups did not differ in terms of gender (χ2(2,30) = 5, p = .082), age 
(χ2(6,30) = 6.857, p = .334) or handedness (χ2(2,30) = 3.36, p = .186). Two 
participants were excluded because of a technical error and because of an unreliable 
performance in the working memory task (>75% of error rate). One of the 
participants presented dyslexia but was not excluded from the analyses as the 
overall performance was not impaired. None of them had visual deficits. The 
experiment was set following ethical clearance and participants had to sign a 
participant consent sheet before starting the experiment and after being given a 
brief. 
Materials 
A computerized version of the Corsi Block-Tapping Test and Phonological 
Maintenance Task were programmed and used in a computer running E-Prime 2.0 
software in the laboratory of psychology in the faculty of Human and Health 
Sciences, as well as a replicated visual categorization and awareness cue task to 
assess the subjective visibility ratings while manipulating the spatial and 
phonological working memory loads. 
All statistical analyses were performed using Microsoft Excel and SPSS and R 
statistical softwares. 
Procedure 
The participants were seated facing the pc monitor. They were explained the 
instructions of the task in which they had been previously and randomly assigned 
(brief). Basically, it consisted of a masking task inside one working memory task in 




two groups differing in the nature of the latter. A third group performed only the 
masking task as the control group. Once they expressed their agreement by signing 
the consent form, they started the experiment immediately. At the end of their 
participation, they were given a debrief explaining the main purposes of the 
experiment. 
Masking Task: in order to continue exploring deeply the main effect observed in the 
task developed by De Loof et al. (2013), this one is set following the same principles 
(please, see the Figure 1). In the most essential respects, this task consisted of a 
priming task using Arabic digits (1, 4, 6 and 9). Eventually, the prime was presented 
as a single digit under the fixation cross, whereas the target number was a portion of 
a mask constituted by three letters and one number following a diamond shape. 
During the entire trial, a fixation cross was fixed in the centre of the screen.  
 
 
Figure 1: The design of the experiment. SOA = stimulus onset asynchrony; ITI = 
interstimulus interval. 
 
The start of the trial was announced by a fugacious larger fixation cross for 150 ms 
just after a period of 500 ms presenting the normal size cross. This cue was followed 
by a normal size fixation cross during 800 ms and immediately after the target 
appeared for 200 ms. Between the vanishment of the cue and the appearance of the 
target, a prime number could be shown under the fixation cross for 16 ms, and the 
time between the onset of the prime and the target (stimulus onset asynchrony or 
SOA) varied randomly between 16, 33, 50, 66 and 100 ms. Like in the original, in 
some trials the prime number was absent (catch trials). After the presentation of the 
mask, the fixation cross remained in the screen and 1000 ms were given to respond 
left if the target was smaller than five, and right if it was larger. Afterwards, a 
feedback screen for 750 ms encouraged participants to respond quicker if no answer 
was registered. Finally, subjective visibility was measured by asking participants 
whether they had seen the prime number or not by pressing left (seen) or right 
(unseen). After the response was registered a new trial started. Importantly, one 
control group performed this task alone, being presented a blank screen for 7 




seconds after which a series of 7 masking trials started. When finished, a new blank 
screen appeared for 7 seconds and a new 7 trials block started. They repeated 25 
series of trials or blocks and performed 10 trials as practice at the beginning. The 
experiment consisted of 175 trials in total lasting for approximately 18 minutes to 
complete. Phonological Maintenance Task: as De Loof et al. (2013) found a 
significant congruency effect in their low-load condition which included 2 letters to 
memorize, it was decided to use words containing two syllables from the Shivde & 
Thompson-Schill (2004) “List of stimuli” to set the phonological working memory task 
(see the Table 1). Containing 28 target items or words, this phonological task was 
designed following the same rules as the original task. After a fixation cross 
appeared in the screen for 2 seconds, an item-word was presented to the participant 
during 3 seconds. Following the experiment of De Loof et al. (2013), in between the 
presentation of the item and the target, the participant responded to 7 masking task 
trials in every block. Once completed, a target single-syllable nonsense word sharing 
a vowel sound with one of the two of the memorized word was presented and it was 
required to state whether the sound of the target matched any of the syllables of the 
item presented before the masking task by pressing a button, which terminated the 
working memory trial and initiated the next. It was decided not to include the final 12 
seconds intertrial intervals, changing them to a response-terminate option which 
appeared to be a conservative change taking into account the technical limitations of 
this undergraduate study. The whole experiment took 25 working memory trials 
lasting for approximately 22 minutes, including 2 phonological trials, 4 masking task 
trials and 5 working memory blocks consecutively as practice at the beginning. 
 
Table 1: List of Stimuli in Phonological Working Memory Task. 

























































Note. Adapted from “Dissociating semantic and phonological maintenance using fMRI,” by G. Shivde 
and S. L. Thompson-Schill, 2004, Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioural Neuroscience, 4, p. 15. 
 
Corsi Block-Tapping Test: in one of the groups, participants were required to answer 
a Corsi visual task following the indications extracted from Claessen et al. (2015). 
The parameters were made simple and as similar as possible to the task used in the 




other experimental group. The screen presented a layout with 9 squares in the 
identical disposition to the original organization developed by Corsi. When the trial 
started, one square was randomly selected by presenting an asterisk in its centre for 
1500 ms. After an interstimulus interval of 1000 ms, a second square was also 
randomly activated for other 1500 ms. The participants were instructed to remember 
the pattern of activation while they were performing 7 masking task trials. At the end 
of these trials, participants switched again to the screen containing the squares and 
had to select the correct pattern of activation using an optical mouse by left-clicking 
in the squares. Taking into account that the experiment designed by De Loof et al. 
(2013) using the Sternberg Task found a significant effect and knowing that this task 
is not testing the manipulation of the information being remembered but its simple 
maintenance in the short-term memory system (Diamond, 2013), it was decided to 
use the forwards version in the Corsi test to make the experiment simple and directly 
comparable. The experiment consisted of 25 spatial trials and 175 masking task 
trials lasting for 20 minutes, including 2 spatial trials, 4 masking task trials and 5 
working memory blocks consecutively as practice at the beginning.  
Results 
In order to explore how different working memory components might affect the 
threshold to consciousness, it is needed to analyse the common measure between 
the groups (the dependent variable), which is the subjective visibility response (seen 
or unseen). (See the Table 2 for a visual summary of the results.) 
The normality tests performed using the Shapiro-Wilk procedure showed significant 
differences with the normal trend in the control group (W = 0.8, p = .015), the 
phonological load condition (W = 0.73, p = .002) and the spatial load condition (W = 
0.819, p = .025). At this point, analysing the variance between the groups in a non-
parametric way (Kruskal-Wallis test), with working memory load as factor (no load in 
the control group, phonological load and spatial load), did not reveal enough 
differences in order to reject the null hypothesis, H(2, 30) = 3.496, p = .174, 
indicating that the samples could originate from the same distribution. 
As the sample sizes are very little and thus more susceptible of big changes due to 
little measurement errors that can lead to substantial distortions in both parametric 
and non-parametric tests (Zimmerman, 1995), it was decided to exclude the relevant 
outliers in an attempt to boost the robustness of the statistical analyses in the 
subjective visibility variable. 
In both experimental conditions, one participant in each group was excluded from the 
analyses as both were performing two standard deviations under the mean of their 
groups. In the control group, as both the mean and the median were close to the 
perfect performance (100% of seen responses) and the standard deviation was very 
high due to the sample size, two participants’ responses were excluded setting the 
limitation of outliers to 1 standard deviation from the mean. 
The normality tests revealed the phonological load group and the spatial load group 
to follow the normal distribution, W = 0.947, p = .66 and W = 0.939, p = .572 
respectively. Although the control group did not change its characteristics in 
comparison to the normal trend (W = 0.777, p = .016), the Leven’s test now showed 
equality in the error variances, F(2, 23) = 2.017, p = .156, and the Kruskal-Wallis test 
showed differences between the groups, H(2, 26) = 6.112, p = .047, indicating that 




the percentage of seen responses varied because of the working memory load 
factor. (See Figure 2 for a graphic view.) 
 
Table 2: Analyses on the Subjective Visibility Ratings. 





Without participants 3 & 17 (eliminated) 
 
N 10 10 10  
Mean (SD) .737 (.325) .812 (.222) .674 (.231)  
W (p) .800 (.015) .730 (.002) .819 (.025)  
Levene F (p) 
(ranked data) 
   4.766 (.017) 
H (p)    3.496 (.174) 
Without participants 14, 15, 18 & 19 (excluded as outliers) 
 
N 8 9 9  
Mean (SD) .871 (.181) .877 (.089) .737 (.124)  
W (p) .777 (.016) .947 (.660) .939 (.572)  
Levene F (p) 
(ranked data) 
   2.017 (.156) 
H (p)    6.112 (.047) 
Further analyses with the ranked transformation (the smallest value as 1) 
 
N 8 9 9  
Mean (SD) 16.625 (9.257) 15.778 (5.832) 8.444 (5.300)  
H (p) [hp2]    3.721 (.040) 
[.244] 
Contrast (p)     
     Linear    5.785 (.023) 
     Quadratic    2.648 (.267) 
Dunnett Post-Hoc p    
     1 vs 2    p = .954 
     1 vs 3    p = .042 
t test (p) 2 vs 3    2.741 (.014) 
 
The analyses of variance with the ranked transformation of the seen responses also 
showed a significant difference across the conditions (F(2, 26) = 3.721, p = .04, hp2 
= .244) and a linear decrease in the measure of the contrast (p = .023). Planned 
comparisons with Dunnett Post-Hoc test, showed a statistically significant difference 
between the control group and the spatial load condition (p = .042), but not with the 
phonological load condition (p = .954). A two-tailed t test between the experimental 




groups also showed enough difference leading to conclude that it is not possible to 
reject the alternative hypothesis (t(16) = 2.741, p < .014). 
 
 
Figure 2: Boxplots of the distributions without outliers. 
 
Further analyses 
Although the priority analyses are already explained, some other results must be 
taken into account in order to draw a complete and critical picture about this study. 
As other previous investigations using the same methodology (De Loof et al., 2013; 
Charles et al., 2013), the data in the present study is showing a sigmoidal function in 
the percentage of seen responses which can be attributed to the main effect of SOA, 
F(2.271, 56.773) = 12.819, p < .001, hp2 = .358. (See Figure 3 for a graphic 
observation.) 
Furthermore, a 2 (congruency: repeated measures) x 5 (SOA: repeated measures) x 
3 (groups: independent factor) mixed ANOVA on the means of correct reaction times 
(RTs) design was analysed in order to observe the possible interactions between 
conditions.  
As previous studies (Vorberg et al., 2003), the presence of a main effect of SOA 
(F(2.603, 5.205) = 3.06, p = .04, hp2 = .102), congruency (F(1, 27) = 30.327, p < 
.001, hp2 = .529), and their interaction (F(4, 108) = 2.662, p = .036, hp2 = .09) 
indicate that, again, these two processes are strongly linked, although the orientation 
of the effect across the different SOA conditions is the opposite (RTs decreased with 
increasing SOA). The grouping factor did not show a main effect (p = .216). No 








Figure 3: A sigmoidal relation between the subjective visibility rating and the SOA shows 
accordance with previous studies. 
 
Repeating the same analyses on the error rates, a principal effect of congruency 
(F(1, 27) = 19.067, p < .001, hp2 = .414) and a secondary effect with SOA (F(4, 108) 
= 4.426, p = .002, hp2 = .141) were revealed. However, no main effect of SOA was 
observed, F(4, 108) = 1.764, p = .141, hp2 = .061. A tertiary effect or three-way 
interaction was found, F(8, 48) = 2.156, p = .043, Wilk’s Λ = .541, hp2 = .264. A main 
independent measures effect of the working memory conditions was also found, F(2, 
27) = 4.076, p = .028, hp2 = .232, showing that the experimental groups were 
committing considerably less errors than the control group.  
Discussion 
The aim of this research was to investigate what differences could there be between 
specific WM modules in the recently tested overlap with subjective visibility. It was 
expected both experimental conditions to differ in the overall ratio of seen responses 
in comparison to the control group. The results partially supported this hypothesis 
showing that the performance in the spatial load condition was less accurate than in 
the control, although there was no effect caused by the phonological load condition. 
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more strongly linked to the conscious network than others and, indeed, that there 
might be a module-dependence. 
Some ideas must be introduced with respect to the data obtained. First, the absence 
of effect produced by the phonological load condition on the subjective visibility 
ratings could imply that those brain areas processing the material in that specific task 
could not be an active part of the conscious network. If we interpret the results not 
only as an overlapping between both functions but as a recruitment of brain areas, 
then the conscious network could simply have more resources as the phonological 
WM would not be operating at its full capacity (as this recognition task does not 
involve necessarily the production of speech). 
Second, the observed effect by the spatial load condition could reveal some insight 
of a specific module-dependence of consciousness. It could be argued that 
consciousness needs the visuo-spatial sketchpad free in order to fully operate. The 
effect found in the spatial load condition goes in line with previous findings. As De 
Loof et al., 2013 used the Sternberg task to increase the WM load in a recognition 
basis, they could have also targeted not the verbal WM module, but the visuo-spatial 
sketchpad (Corbin & Marquer, 2013). 
Finally, the differences also observed between the experimental groups could imply 
several things. As the phonological task was targeting mainly the left parietal lobe 
and the visuo-spatial task was targeting mainly the right hemisphere, it could be 
drawn from these results that the right parietal lobe could be more crucial in the 
conscious span than it is the left parietal lobe (Kessels et al., 2000). 
However, it could also be argued that the effect observed in comparison to the 
phonological load is not revealing a quality-dependence (what system is used), but 
instead a quantity-dependence (how many systems are used) as the Corsi task 
could not only be targeting the visuo-spatial sketchpad, but also the episodic buffer 
due to the memorization of the sequences of activation in the squares (Ferreira et 
al., 1998). This can also be explained as the Corsi task leads activations not only in 
the right parietal lobe, but also in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (D’Esposito & 
Postle, 1999). A second explanation could be drawn as the Corsi task implies a 
delay recall test and that the participants need to actively recall the items 
memorized. In comparison to the phonological maintenance task in which it is 
needed to recognize a sound, the proactive property of the Corsi task could be 
causing the observed differential. Nonetheless, between the prefrontal cortex and 
the parietal lobe, clinical evidence may indicate the latter as being more relevant 
when it comes to producing awareness. Patients suffering from hemispatialanogsias, 
or deficits in awareness of one side of their bodies or the surrounding environments, 
tend to show insults in their right parietal lobes (Vallar and Perani, 1986). By 
contrast, lesions of the prefrontal cortex are commonly related to executive 
impairments rather to alterations on awareness itself (Burgess, 2000; Silk et al., 
2006; Stuss and Alexander, 2007). Finally, it is impossible to simply state that the 
right parietal lobe, or indeed the right hemisphere, is more important to produce 
awareness. Gazzaniga (2000) suggests that although each hemisphere works 
independently of the other, the integrated sensation even observed in split brains 
gives us some insight about awareness, as it could be intimately and ultimately 
linked to a process of giving a meaning to the other processes carried out in the 
brain. This idea has been worked for a long time, with Roser & Gazzaniga (2004) 




suggesting the unitary narrative to be produced thanks to a distributed processing or 
the integration of separated modules. If both modules are imagined as two different 
RAM memories, as the majority of PCs nowadays use a dedicated graphics-RAM 
separated from a sound card-RAM, it could actually be happening that the memory 
related to language is more sophisticated and thus requires of more use (load) in 
order to significantly affect the general RAM (which would be the conscious network 
at this point). 
A continuation study of De Loof et al. (2015) has recently examined how the 
visuospatial and the executive aspects of working memory may differ in their impact 
on visual awareness. They observe that although both WM aspects affect the speed 
in processing a masking task, there is no effect of the visuospatial load. These 
results are concluded as visuospatial having a more persistent and stable impact on 
visual awareness whereas the executive WM presents a more gradual impact. There 
are two reasons given to understand this apparent lack of interference of visuospatial 
load on visual awareness. One reason is focusing on the methodology, as their task 
could have been targeting mainly the object characteristics rather than its spatial 
locations. The other arises thanks to Rissman et al. (2008) whose evidence suggest 
that low loadings on memory are using mainly the resources in the PPN, while higher 
loadings could be using also a special type of cache memory system held mainly in 
the hippocampal regions. 
Bearing all this in mind, it can be interpreted the conscious network to be operating 
as with the same properties as the higher order executive functions: it requires some 
degree of activity and is constructed upon WM, inhibition and shifting. 
The research explained in this paper shows several limitations that prevent from 
extrapolating conclusions to the rest of the human population. The sample size as 
well as the sample characteristics (gender, age…) make it impossible to state 
whether the observed effects can be understood as a human condition. Only 
incrementing the size and variability of the sample would it be possible to begin 
making strong general predictions. The tasks used also need to be interpreted with 
respect to the theories behind. So, in order to state that there is no mental overlap 
between the phonological loop and the conscious network, it is first needed to 
investigate other tasks addressing other aspects of that phonological WM 
subsystem. Thus, the replication of the priming task taken from De Loof et al. (2013) 
could have tiny but significant differences to the original, as the time between the 
onset of the cue and the onset of the target is not fixed to 800ms. In this case, we 
can only try to be conservative and sceptical towards the results. Also, the groups 
compared might differ in ways they should not. For instance, participants in the 
experimental groups tend to show greater RTs and less errors in comparison to the 
control group. That could be argued as not affecting the conclusions (as they were 
performing better, the WM tasks were not impairing the overall performance), but 
that could also be argued as to be affecting the visibility ratios in a way that cannot 
be easily understood. Opposing the theory, the SOA produced a contradictory 
(facilitation) effect on RTs and had no effect on the error rates, possibly exposing a 
lack of concentration among the participants. As executive functions cannot work 
without attention that could explain the absence of effect observed in the 
phonological load condition. 




Hence, in further research it should be strongly considered to continue doing 
replications. Adding and changing the WM tasks in an attempt to find different ways 
of interaction between this executive function and consciousness. This could help us 
mapping the functional pathways of the conscious contents.  
Implementing tasks targeting the inhibitory control could lead to indirect interactions 
between consciousness and WM, as inhibition has been conceptualized as a shield 
protecting WM while the latter is enabling the transfer of the information to the long-
term memory system (Diamond, 2013). Moreover, future research projects should 
investigate deeply the possible interactions between different executive functions. 
Consciousness might imply a process of ‘Executive Fusion’ in which some EFs are 
fusing and, thus, using the same neural resources, in order to create the holistic 
active representations of the conscious world we all perceive. 
Finally, transcortical magnetic stimulation (TMS) can be useful in the future as it 
could allow the experimenters better handling when selecting specific brain areas 
associated to specific WM modules. Pascual-Leone et al. (1994), for instance, 
observed important impairments in double stimulus tasks when administered to the 
parietal lobe. 
Conclusion 
Based upon the findings it could be said that not all the WM modules seem to 
overload in the same way the conscious network. Whereas the spatial and possibly 
the temporal aspects of WM seem to share the same resources as the conscious 
network (presumably in the right parietal lobe and the prefrontal cortex), the 
phonological rehearsal WM processing could be out of the conscious network. This 
could reveal that language related information processed in WM might not be 
overlapping to the same extent as spatial information when it comes to producing 
conscious perception of visual stimuli. 
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